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I. INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy is the primary tool of macroeconomic management in nearly all industrialized countries. When monetary policy needs to be tightened (loosened), the central bank or monetary authority will increase (decrease) the official interest rate, banks and other types of financial institutions will follow suit by raising (reducing) their deposit and lending rates. Faced with higher (lower) cost of funds, consumers and companies will adjust their consumption and expenditure accordingly, thus affecting output and inflation. The efficacy of monetary policy thus depends on how fast and to what extent financial institutions pass through changes in the official rate to their customers.
While there are numerous studies on monetary policy transmission, the retail interest rates pass-through process is relatively under-explored, at least until recently. Most of the studies on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy assume immediate and complete pass-through of changes in official rates to retail bank rates (for example, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Altunbas et al, 2002) . Recent studies show that the pass-through may be incomplete and that the adjustment speed may be sluggish. The passthrough and adjustment speed also differ across financial institutions and across financial products, which implies that the speed of monetary transmission varies across different segments of the banking sector. Further, some studies also find that the adjustment speed is different depending on whether rates are above or below their long-term equilibrium level (Chong et al, 2005; Kleimeier and Sander, 2005) .
In this study, we examine the degree of pass-through and adjustment speed of retail interest rates when benchmark interest rates change in New
Zealand. Specifically, we analyze the following issues: Firstly, we consider the long-term pass-through of the official rate and interbank rate to various retail interest rates such as deposit and lending rates including the base lending rate and mortgage rates of different maturities. We employ the Phillips-Loretan (1991) methodology which eliminates asymptotic bias problems and allows for meaningful statistical inferences on the long-run coefficients. By incorporating the effect of dynamics in the data generation process (DGP), this method also accounts explicitly for the role of past policy surprises and future expected policy settings in the relationship between retail rates and policy instruments. Secondly, we examine the short-term pass-through and the adjustment speed of retail interest rates using an error correction model and also test whether the adjustment speed is symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, we investigate whether a change in monetary policy operating procedures and increased transparency of monetary policy as a result of the adoption of the Official Cash Rate (OCR) instrument in 1999 has had a different effect on the pass-through and adjustment speed of interest rates in New Zealand.
There are at least three reasons why a study of the New Zealand transmission mechanism is important. Firstly, New Zealand is the first country to adopt an explicit inflation targeting regime with specific accountability and transparency provisions. These arrangements became a prototype model for the policy frameworks adopted by other OECD countries and more recently a number of developing countries. Secondly, unlike most other countries, there was a major shift in the monetary control mechanism in New Zealand during this period away from quantity targets (settlement cash balances) and towards price based (OCR) settings. Although under either of these two regimes the transmission of monetary policy would operate primarily through interest rates, the question is whether and to what extent there will be a change in the degree and adjustment speed of pass-through from policy instruments to retail rates and by implication to the effectiveness of monetary control. We would expect that under a price regime the role of interest rates in the transmission mechanism will become much more transparent. Settlement cash balances, unlike interest rates (and exchange rates), do not normally have a stable relationship with nominal income or inflation and generally lead to considerably higher interest rate volatility compared to an interest rate target. Quantity targets do, however, offer certain operating advantages as they provide a better cushion against accommodating unintentionally inflationary increases as is often the case under an interest rate targeting regime. They also facilitate a rapid interest rate response which may be crucial during periods of high or renewed inflationary pressures (see Spencer, 1992) .
The third reason relates to the observation that New Zealand is one of the most heavily indebted OECD countries and its household sector has negative savings rate. The banking sector, almost all foreign owned, relies more and more on overseas borrowing. It would be interesting to see the effectiveness of monetary policy when there are leakages in the system. According to official statistics by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, as of March 2005, the private sector's foreign debt was NZ$149 billion, or 101 percent of New Zealand's GDP, which is 8.8 times more than the government's overseas debt (NZ$17 billion, or 12 percent of GDP). While the business sector has increased their savings due to higher profits, the household savings have been declining steadily. The New Zealand household sector has one of the lowest savings rates among the OECD countries. According to Statistics New Zealand, households in New Zealand on average do not save anything out of current income but, instead, "dis-save" about 12 percent of income per year. Residential mortgage debt accounts for 90 percent of the total household debt which in turn accounts for over 50 percent of the total loan portfolio of all New Zealand's financial institutions.
i As a result of the shortage of local savings, banks in New Zealand have been increasingly borrowing wholesale funds from overseas markets to meet the strong demand for mortgages, which may have some impact on the relationship between OCR and fixed-rate mortgages.
Our findings show that the long-term pass-through of market interest rates to various retail rates differs across financial products. Some rates show complete pass-through while others do not. The short-term pass-through and adjustment speed also differ across products. We find no evidence that banks in New Zealand adjust their rates (both lending and deposit rates) up more slowly than they adjust them down. The introduction of OCR has increased the longterm pass-through of floating and fixed deposit rates, but had no impact on the other rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some institutional background on New Zealand monetary policy. Section 3 provides the conceptual framework and the literature review. Section 4 outlines our methodology. Section 5 discusses the data and results and the final section concludes the paper.
II. MONETARY POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), New Zealand's central bank, is responsible for operating monetary policy independently to achieve price stability which is defined in the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA). The PTA is a specific and public contract negotiated between the Governor of the Reserve Bank and Bank to keep inflation as measured by annual increase of CPI between 1 and 3 percent on average over the medium term.
In the 1990 and 1993 PTAs, price stability was defined to be 0 to 2 percent inflation over a one year period. The target band was widened to 0 to 3 percent in the December 1996 PTA. As inflation had actually been outside the target range on the upper side for nearly two years at that point and never below 1 percent, the new target band in essence did not represent a major shift in regime.
However, pressing difficulties to keep inflation within the target band forced the Reserve Bank at the time to make a major shift in policy setting.
Previously, the Bank had set policy so as to avoid moving outside the target range a year ahead. It had made that judgment largely on the basis of the direct transmission effect from foreign prices through the exchange rate onto inflation (see Huang, Margaritis and Mayes, 2001 Under the menu costs hypothesis, banks are reluctant to change their interest rates if the changes of the benchmark interest rates are very small and/or temporary in nature (see Dutta et al., 1999) . As there are adjustment costs involved in changing retail interest rates to bank customers, banks may respond slowly to temporary changes in monetary policy rate, but quickly to more permanent changes in policy rates.
Under the switching cost hypothesis, customers are unlikely to switch financial products and/or institutions in search of better funding or investment terms when there are high switching costs (see Heffernan, 1997) . Customers need to spend time and effort to find out which bank offers the best deal and may find it too inconvenient and/or too costly to switch banks. For example, in the case of prepayment of loans and early withdrawal of time deposits by customers, some banks may charge a fee to make it costly for the customers to exercise those embedded options. The rigidity in interest rates may thus be attributed to the banks' exploitation of consumers' inertia in switching financial products and/or institutions. If banks can selectively price their products to exploit customers' inertia, then rates are expected to be rigid upwards for customer deposits, but downwards for loans. In other words, banks may adjust their deposit rate upwards more slowly and adjust their loan rate downwards more slowly. This will lead to asymmetry in the adjustment speed in interest rates.
Under the imperfect competition hypothesis, because of the collusive price arrangement among banks, rate adjustments in uncompetitive markets can be asymmetric, i.e., deposit rates are expected to be rigid upwards, while loan rates are expected to be rigid downwards (see Hannan and Berger, 1991, Neuman and Sharpe, 1992) .
Finally, according to the asymmetric information hypothesis, banks face both adverse selection and moral hazard problems when they are required to raise loan rates in response to rising market interest rates (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . The presence of agency costs makes banks more reluctant to increase loan rates significantly over a short period of time. Higher loan rates make loan payments more difficult for borrowers, leading to more problem loans and defaults. Unless their margins are under pressure and market rates are expected to remain high, banks are reluctant to raise loan rates. Instead, banks are more likely to ration the amount of credit extended to borrowers when there is an upward pressure on loan rates. As a result, loan rates are expected to be more rigid upwards under the asymmetric information model.
A combination of the above factors may play a different role in the retail interest rates' short-term and long-term adjustment process. Switching cost and menu costs, for example, are more likely to be the primary factors in influencing the short-term adjustment speed whereas imperfect competition and asymmetric information are more likely to be the primary factors in affecting the long-term pass-through (see Bondt, 2002) .
Thus it becomes an empirical question as to whether the deposit rates and loan rates are more rigid upwards or downwards. Furthermore, it is also likely for the rigidity in retail interest rates to vary across different financial products. For example, such differences may be observed for loan rates versus deposits rates, floating mortgages versus fixed rate mortgages, short-term versus long-term rates, depending on the relative level of customers' inertia or the importance of switching costs. Customer inertia, for example, may be greater on saving deposit than on time deposits.
Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neuman and Sharpe (1992) were the first to study the stickiness of deposit rates. While assuming complete and immediate pass-through for retail lending rates, they examined the impact of market power in the deposit market on the stickiness of deposit rates in the United States. They found asymmetric adjustment in the deposit rate, i.e., banks adjust their deposit rates upwards more slowly than they adjust them downwards and they attributed it to banks' market power in the deposit market. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) were the first to study the pass-through to retail lending rates. Using an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model, they examined the response of lending rates in both developed and developing countries to changes in market interest rates. They found that interest rate pass-through differs across countries and that loan rate stickiness can be reduced by several factors: the existence of a market for short-term negotiable instrument, lower money market interest rate volatility, and relatively weak barrier to entry/competition. Paisley (1994) and Heffernan (1997) examined the relationship between market rates and retail rates in the UK. Whilst Paisley (1994) did not find complete pass-thorough in mortgage rates for British building societies, Heffernan (1997) found complete pass-through in repayment mortgages but incomplete pass-through for current and savings accounts of British banks and building societies. Hofmann and Mizen (2004) studied 13 deposit and mortgage products of individual British financial institutions using a non-linear model and found complete pass-through for deposit rates but not for mortgage rates.
Mojon (2000) examined the short-term pass-through to lending and deposit rates in five Euro-area countries, (Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands and Spain), assuming there is full pass-through in the long term. He found that retail interest rates respond sluggishly to changes in money market rates; long-term rates respond more slowly than short-term rates, and there is an asymmetry in the degree of pass-through. Pass-through to lending rates is higher when market rates are increasing than when they are decreasing, but the opposite is true for deposit rates. Bondt (2002) examined the relationship between government bond yields and deposit and lending rates on a matchedmaturity basis for the Euro area as a whole. He found that pass-through is complete for most lending rates, but it is incomplete on impact for both deposit and lending rates. Kleimeier and Sander (2005) examined the pass-through in the euro-zone's retail banking markets and found that loan rates respond faster to changes in anticipated monetary impulses.
Chong et al (2005) examined the deposit rates of various maturities and lending rates of both commercial banks and finance companies in Singapore and found that financial institutions adjust their rates upwards more slowly than they adjust downwards. They also found that the adjustment speed differs across financial products and between banks and finance companies. They did not find complete pass-through of interest rates.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we examine both the long-run and short-run pass-through of monetary policy rates to various retail interest rates as well as the adjustment speed of the short-term dynamics to the long-term equilibrium relationship.
The long-term relationship between the retail interest rate and the benchmark market rate is expressed as:
where t y is the bank lending or deposit rate; t x represents the corresponding policy or money market rate; t ε is the error term; 0 α and 1 α are the long-run parameters. The interest rate series are expected to be integrated, I(1), variables and the error term is expected to be stationary. As discussed in Rousseas (1985) , 0 α measures the markup and 1 α measures the degree of pass-through in the long term. The long-run pass-through is complete if 1 α is statistically not different from one.
We estimate equation (1) using the Phillips-Loretan (1991) method. This method is well suited to the estimation of long-run relationship involving integrated variables where dynamics may play an important role in the DGP for t y . It is modeled by the following triangular system of equations:
where
is a stationary vector. Equation (1a) can be estimated using single equation methods, and provided that the equation is appropriately augmented, the asymptotic properties of the estimator and its distribution can be readily determined. These properties hinge on the interrelationships that exist between t u 1 and t u 2 , which are assumed to be stationary.
If the variance-covariance matrix of t u is block diagonal (so that the partitioned elements of the vector do not co-vary) and t u is also (i.i.d.) then equation (1a) can be estimated using least squares. The estimates will be normally distributed, at least asymptotically, and will be equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the system. This result is important as it enables statistical inference using standard statistical tables to be used with integrated variables. The inclusion of two-sided lag differences eliminates the endogeneity problem, while the autocorrelation problem may need to be remedied by including lags of the error correction term too. Phillips and Loretan then estimate the following equation using least squares:
Phillips and Loretan demonstrate that the parameter estimates from estimating this single equation are equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation of the system and hence are efficient. Furthermore, the parameters are asymptotically unbiased and normally distributed. In contrast, the OLS estimator of (1) while superconsistent is not asymptotically unbiased or normally distributed and its finite sample bias may be large and persistent. An added advantage of considering the specification given by (1c) is that it accounts explicitly for the role of past policy surprises and future expected policy settings in the relationship between retail rates and policy instruments.
Equation (1) is a long run model. As monetary policy rate changes, banks will not adjust their retail rates immediately. Short-term rates are expected to be adjusted more quickly than medium and long-term rates since the latter depend on future short-term rates as well as current short-term rates.
To examine the short-run dynamics of interest rate changes in response to changes in the policy or money market rates, we employ a structural errorcorrection methodology that explicitly models contemporaneous changes in the policy variable. The error-correction (ECM) representation corresponding to a general ADL(p,q) model is given by:
where ∆ denotes first difference operator; The mean adjustment lag (MAL) of a complete pass-through for a general ADL(p,q) model or its equivalent ECM parameterization, can be calculated using the formula given in Hendry (1995) . For the special case of an ADL(1,1) model, this simplifies to:
The MAL is simply the weighted average of all lags and it is a measure of the speed with which retails rates respond to movements in policy rates.
Several studies have shown that the short-term adjustment may be asymmetric, in other words, the adjustment speed may differ when rates are above the equilibrium from that when rates are below (see Chong et al, 2005 and Scholnick, 1996) . To test for the existence of asymmetric adjustments in the retail rates in New Zealand, we add a dummy variable, λ , to Equation (2). λ is equal to one if the residual, As with the symmetric adjustment case, we can define the asymmetric mean adjustment lags (MAL) of a complete pass-through using the formula in Hendry (1995) . For the special case of an ADL(1,1) model, this is given by: 
V. DATA AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Data
We use monthly series of interest rate data from two sources. The fixed mortgage rates of maturities of one to three years are obtained from a major commercial bank in New Zealand and the rest of the data, namely, the base lending rate, the floating mortgage rate and the six-month time deposit rate, the substantially with the introduction of OCR. Previously, the monthly volatility of interest rates was much higher, more than 1 percent for most series, with the overnight interbank rate having the highest monthly volatility at 1.72 percent.
After the OCR was introduced, interest rates became much more stable than before, the monthly volatility of all the rates declined to the range of 0.6 to 0.75 percent. 
Long-Term Pass-Through and Structural Change
Having established that the overnight interbank interest rate is cointegrated with the various retail interest rates, we then estimate the long-term pass-through for the whole sample. The results of both Phillips-Loretan estimator and the OLS estimator are reported in Table 5 . Our results show that the Phillips-Loretan estimates can differ quite substantially in some cases from the OLS estimates.
Hence, the OLS results, especially t-values, should be interpreted with caution.
On the other hand, from Tables 4 and 5 (pass-through). In general, the degree of long-term pass-through is higher for short-term retail interest rates than that for longer-term rates. This is consistent with the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. As the OCR is an overnight rate, it is more highly correlated with short-term rates than with long-term rates. Long-term rates are influenced not only by current shortterm rates but also future short-term rates.
Notes: RHS Variable (x) is interbank rate. The degree of pass-through is measured by the slope, 1 α .
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level. Numbers in brackets are t-ratios of estimated coefficients (the null hypothesis is: 1 α =0); all estimates and statistics are computed using the Phillips-Loretan method unless otherwise stated. χ 2 ( 1 α =1) is the test statistic for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is equal to one (complete pass-through). DW values for OLS regressions (not reported here) are quite low indicating the presence of serial correlation and possibly misspecified (omitted) dynamics. The column under the heading "Slope Dummy" measure the changes in the long-term pass through after the introduction of the OCR regime. * indicates significance at the 5 percent level; ** indicates significance at 10 percent. 
)
The results show that prior to the introduction of OCR in 1999, the longterm degree of pass-through for all series was in the range of 52.6% to 67.4%, none of which is complete. In comparison, after the introduction of OCR, the degree of pass-through for the floating mortgage rate, the base lending rate and the 6-month deposit rate increased, but that for the fixed 1-3 year mortgage rates did not change significantly (at least not statistically). In fact the degree of pass through is statistically complete for the floating and base rates at the 5 percent level and for the 6-month deposit rate at the 10 percent level (the p-values for testing the hypothesis that the sum of the slope coefficients is equal to 1 in Table   6 are 0.653, 0.746 and 0.087 for the floating, base lending and 6-month deposit rate equations, respectively).
The increase in the long-term pass-through from official to retail rates is probably due to less interest rate volatility and more transparency and competition in the marketplace. After the introduction of OCR, interest rates, as expected, became much less volatile, as shown in Table 1 . With more stable interest rates, we would expect bank interest rate adjustment costs to decrease and hence a higher degree of pass-through. In addition, with the introduction of OCR, there has been more transparency in the way policy is set and communicated to the financial markets resulting in more competition in the banking industry. Kleimeier and Sander (2005) 
Short-Term Pass-Through and Adjustment Speed
We use bivariate specifications of structural-error-correction (SEC) models to estimate the short-run dynamics of adjustment of retail interest rates and benchmark wholesale rates. The results of the retail interest rate adjustment are reported in Table 7 . We only report the estimates for the impact and error correction coefficients. Coefficient estimates for the other variables in the retail interest rate equations and the results of the interbank rate equations are not reported but are available upon request. All the parameters have the expected sign and are statistically significant. The impact pass-through coefficients, β o , are positive and statistically significant. For fixed rate mortgages, the contemporaneous pass-through, ranges from 35.3% for the base lending rate to 86.2% for the 1-year fixed rate. All the estimates of error correction speed or adjustment speed, δ , are negative and statistically significant, indicating that the retail rates mean-revert to their long-run equilibrium values. The mean adjustment lags show a similar picture. It only takes less than a month for 1-year fixed rates to complete on average their adjustment but takes close to 4 months for the three-year fixed rate mortgages to go through the same process. Hendry 1995) significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10% level. 
The short-term retail rates, e.g, the one-year fixed rate and the six-month time deposit rate show both greater degree of short-term pass-through and speedier adjustment. Banks have been known to compete intensely in these segments and more so under the OCR regime. Residential mortgages are very important for New Zealand banks. Over the past few years, they account for over 50 percent of all banks' loan portfolio. For some banks, it accounts for over 70 percent of their total loans and advances. In order to gain market share of residential mortgage, banks have been competing intensely with each other, especially in the short-term fixed rate mortgage market. vi Competition for deposits is also very keen. As discussed earlier, the rate of savings in New Zealand is among the lowest in the industrialized countries and banks have to borrow a large amount of wholesale funds from overseas to finance their loan growth. Domestic deposits are preferable as they are more stable and less sensitive to changes in interest rates.
Asymmetric Adjustment Speed
We estimate structural error-correction models that allow for different speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. The results on the asymmetric adjustment models are reported in Table 8 . Comparing the asymmetric adjustment speed coefficients, δ 2 and δ 3 , there is no evidence of asymmetric adjustment speed for any of the retail interest rates. We also estimated the impact of the introduction OCR on the asymmetric adjustment speed, there is no statistically significant difference either. There is some evidence to suggest that a differential speed of adjustment may exist for the base lending rate but the results are not conclusive.
We also investigated the possibility that bank adjusted rates upwards at a different speed than adjusting them downwards during the post OCR period but there was no conclusive evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case. There was some weak evidence again that banks adjust rates faster upwards for base lending rates post OCR and also that they adjust rates faster downwards for the 1-year fixed rate. The latter result may be indicative of the intense competition that is taking place among banks in recent years for market share in this particular market segment. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined the following issues: Firstly, we considered the long-term pass through of various retail interest rates including mortgage rates of different maturities. Secondly, we examined the short-term pass-through and the adjustment speed of those retail interest rates using an error correction and test whether the adjustment is symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, we investigated whether a change in monetary policy operating procedures as a result of the adoption of the Official Cash Rate (OCR) instrument in 1999 has had a different effect on the pass-through and adjustment speed of interest rates in New Zealand.
Our findings show that the long-term pass-through of retail rates varies across financial products. Short-term rates show a higher degree of pass-through and faster adjustment speed than long-term rates, but there is no evidence of significant asymmetric adjustment. We also find that the introduction of OCR is associated with an increase in the pass-through for floating and deposit rates but not for fixed mortgage rates. The latter result suggests that in a small open economy with a substantial amount of overseas borrowing the effectiveness of monetary policy may be weakened.
Overall, our results show that monetary policy rate has more influence on short-term interest rates. We also find evidence suggesting that increased transparency in the conduct of monetary policy has reduced the volatility of official policy rates and led to more competition in the banking industry. As monetary policy transparency increases and interest rate volatility decreases, future short-term rate changes become less uncertain, thereby enhancing the degree of pass-through of official rates to retail rates in tandem with the efficacy of monetary policy.
NOTES
1 The New Zealand financial system is dominated by banks. Bank assets account for 76% of the total assets of the financial system. Foreign own banks dominate the banking system. 98% of bank assets are owned by foreign banks, mostly Australian banks (RBNZ, 2005 3 This is in contrast to the volatile experience with the MCI where markets, particularly those offshore, had at times difficulties reading the signals of policy. 4 We assessed whether the overnight interbank can be used as a proxy of monetary policy stance. We adopt a two step procedure. First, we test the relationship between the two series over the period between March 1999 and December 2004. We find that the two series cointegrate using a Johansen test and that the slope coefficient has an estimated value of .99 which is insignificantly different from one (Johansen cointegrating restriction χ 2 test p-value=.19). Secondly, we estimate the long-term relationship between OCR and the various retail interest rates over the same period. We also estimate the long-term relationship between the overnight interbank interest rate and the various retail rates over the same period. The results are very similar using either the OCR or the overnight rate, indicating that the overnight interbank rate can be used as a proxy for the monetary policy stance, which is a common practice in the literature (Chong et al, 2005) . To test for robustness, we also used the 90 T-bill rate as an alternative measure of the market benchmark rate. The results are similar to those of using the interbank rate. 5 It is possible that the finite bias of the OLS estimator may be less or negligible compared to the other two estimators for floating and possibly base-lending rates to the extent that there are no dynamics in the DGP for those interest rates (as banks typically adjust them in full after a policy change) and switching or menu costs are unimportant. 6As at March 2005, about 25% of mortgages are priced on a floating rate basis and 75% on a fixed rate basis. Among the fixed rate mortgages, 30% out of the 75% is fixed for up to one-year, 35% fixed for one to two year, and only 10% are for the remaining fixed terms (i.e., three and five-year fixed rates).
